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Abstract  
This paper estimates the impacts that the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, 
implemented in 2009, has had on labor market outcomes within the policy region. The Regional 
Greenhouse Gas Initiative is a carbon cap-and-trade program that consists of ten states in the 
Northeast. Using a difference-in-difference framework, I found that, overall, there was no 
significant impact on the annual employment growth rate because of RGGI. When broken down 
into industry-specific effects, most industries still had no significant employment effects, 
although the mining industry did see a weakly significant 0.09 percentage point decrease in its 
annual employment growth rate. These estimates are based on the time period of 2001 – 2018. 
This paper provides initial evidence on how the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative has 
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Section 1 – Introduction  
In recent years, the impacts of environmental regulations have become more heavily 
debated. As a central issue throughout the most recent presidential election, the different 
concerns regarding environmental policies were countered by the benefits that advocates 
proposed. Among the highest concerns was the impact that environmental regulations will have 
on employment. This concern was the highlight of former President Trump’s reasoning for 
leaving the Paris Climate Agreement, citing that regulations would increase costs for companies, 
either causing mass layoffs to occur or the shutdown of entire firms (Borchers and Phillips 
2017). However, other politicians, such as Rep. Ocasio-Cortez and other supporters of the Green 
New Deal, claim that environmental regulations can strengthen the economy by creating new, 
green jobs (Kurtzleben 2019). The effects of environmental policies on employment largely 
depend on their structure and implementation. This paper seeks to inform the public and 
policymakers about the effect that environmental policies can have on employment through 
examining the employment impact of the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI). 
RGGI began in 2009 as a regional cap and trade system agreed on by ten Northeast states 
in the US (Elements of RGGI 2021). RGGI is the first mandatory, market-based CO2 emissions 
reduction program in the United States. Each year, auctions are held in these states for electric 
power plants to purchase allowances in order to emit a certain number of tons of CO2 per year. 
The number of allowances is capped to a certain number each year within the region. This cap 
has been adjusted over time to decrease emissions and account for allowances that firms have 
banked for future use. States also have the discretion to use the revenues from their CO2 auctions 
however they see fit. Most use the revenue for energy efficiency projects (The Investments of 
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RGGI Proceeds in 2018). While RGGI only effects the utilities labor market directly, this allows 
me to observe the pass-through effects of environmental policies to other sectors that may be 
indirectly impacted by the regulations and hold a larger share of employment.  
 I utilize a simple labor market model to explain the theory behind my empirical analysis. 
This model illustrates the various effects that environmental policies can have on employment. 
The first is the factor substitution effect. The cap-and-trade policy may increase labor demand as 
firms substitute away from energy towards labor. However, the policy may also decrease labor 
demand. RGGI could increase a firm’s marginal cost and therefore decrease its output. This is 
called the output effect. Another effect comes from the increase in market price after the shift in 
the market supply curve. Lastly, these effects could be minimized depending on what states do 
with their auction revenues. Since there are multiple effects that can impact the labor market 
outcomes of this cap-and-trade policy, the overall effect determined by the theoretical model is 
ambiguous. Therefore, further empirical analysis is necessary to determine the actual size of the 
effect.   
My empirical methods are most closely related to Greenstone (2002), Yamazaki (2017), 
and Huang and Zhou (2019). I use industry and state-level data to show the changes in 
employment before and after RGGI was implemented. These data are from the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis and they provide information on employment numbers and wage. My 
treatment region is comprised of all states that were in RGGI from 2009 – 2018, excluding New 
Jersey. My control region consists of states that are in the Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland 
energy market that are not also in RGGI. The time period of my data is from 2001 – 2018. I use a 
difference-in-difference equation to estimate the impact that RGGI had on employment growth. I 
also use various fixed effects and state covariates to attempt to control for other events that may 
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have happened at the same time as RGGI and impacted employment. I use a difference in 
difference approach to estimate both the overall impact of RGGI and industry-specific impacts. 
 The results indicated that RGGI had no significant impact on employment overall for the 
policy region. When broken down by industry, RGGI had a weakly significant negative impact 
on the mining industry. Based off of my results, annual employment growth rate in the mining 
industry decreased by 0.09 percentage points because of RGGI. This result is consistent with 
previous studies that have shown that energy intense industries are more vulnerable to impacts 
from environmental policy (Yamazaki 2017). My results also return some unexpected results, 
such as a significant negative impact on the finance industry and a significant positive impact on 
the accommodation services industry. These results may indicate that different specifications or 
more data are required to control for outside effects more accurately.  
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 covers the history of RGGI, its 
construction, implementation, and effects. Section 3 examines previous papers that have been 
written about RGGI and the effects of environmental regulation on the labor market. Section 4 
identifies the theoretical labor model that shows how RGGI would impact employment. Section 
5 explores the empirical analysis and I explain my data, methods, results, and robustness checks. 
Lastly, in Section 6 I discuss the conclusions that arise from this analysis.  
Section 2 – Overview of RGGI 
In 2003, the governors of nine states gathered to discuss the possibility of starting a 
regional cap-and-trade system to curb greenhouse gas emissions. Seven of the original nine states 
signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) in 2005 that outlined the framework of the 
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI). The remaining two states, as well as Maryland, 
signed the MOU in 2007, and RGGI went into effect on January 1, 2009, with Connecticut, 
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Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Rhode 
Island, and Vermont as member states. In 2012, New Jersey withdrew from RGGI, but rejoined 
in 2020. Lastly, Virginia joined in 2021. 
RGGI is an agreement between eleven states in Northeast of the United States to reduce 
carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from the region. It is the first mandatory, market-based CO2 
emission reduction program in the United States (Elements of RGGI 2021). Figure 1 shows a 
map of the RGGI states. Through independent regulations, these states have agreed to moderate 
CO2 emissions from their states in order to comply with the RGGI Model Rule set through the 
collaboration of members. Within the RGGI states, fossil-fuel-fired electric power generators 
with a capacity of 25 megawatts or greater are required to hold allowances equal to their CO2 
emissions over a three-year period (Elements of RGGI 2021). Firms buy allowances at regional 
auctions and can trade them in secondary markets with other firms. One allowance is equal to 










Figure 1: Map highlighting the member states of RGGI. New Jersey and Virginia are highlighted in light yellow 
because they joined most recently. Source: RGGI Project Series (https://www.rggiprojectseries.org/states)  
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Each state sets independent regulations that follow the RGGI Model Rule. The involved 
states have established CO2 Budget Trading Programs that limit emissions of CO2 from electric 
powerplants, issue CO2 allowances, and establish participation in regional CO2 allowance 
auctions (Elements RGGI 2021). All of the allowances administered by the state budgets add up 
to the total RGGI cap. RGGI caps have been adjusted since the inception of the program to 
reflect trends. At the beginning of the program in 2009, the cap was 188 million allowances. This 
cap has been adjusted over time to decrease emissions and account for allowances that firms 
have banked for future use. In 2021, the adjusted cap is just over 100 million allowances. 
In RGGI auctions, there is a cost containment reserve (CCR) that consists of extra 
allowances available for purchase if auction prices reach a certain point. This was created in 
order to keep allowance prices below a certain level. Moving forward, this price will increase as 
the number of allowances decreases to help minimize CO2 emissions over the years. The trigger 
price in 2020 was $10.77 and in 2021 it is $13 (Elements of RGGI 2021). There is also an 
emission containment reserve (ECR) that was first implemented in 2021. The states will 
withhold allowances to create additional emissions reductions and to make sure that auction 
prices do not fall below a certain level. This price will also increase each year. For 2021, the 
ECR trigger price is $6.00 (RGGI 2016 Program Review 2017, 3). 
Each state also decides what to do with the revenue from their auctions. Many of the 
investments go to energy bill assistance, increasing energy efficiency, and funding renewable 
energy. In the region, 38% of RGGI investments go to energy efficiency projects, 19% to clean 
and renewable energy infrastructure, 20% to greenhouse gas abatement, and 16% to direct bill 
assistance (The Investments of RGGI Proceeds in 2018, 5). RGGI, Inc reports that these 
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investment actions prevented 273,217 short tons of CO2 from being emitted into the atmosphere 
in 2018 and saved $113,711,413 on energy bills.  
Overall, the intent of RGGI is to decrease CO2 emissions. A report from RGGI, Inc states 
that annual average emissions in the RGGI-region decreased by 45.3% from 2008 – 2017 (RGGI 
2019, 7). However, exactly where these reductions come from is debated. A study by Kim and 
Kim (2016) found that coal to natural gas switching was accelerated by RGGI in the policy 
region, which may have contributed to emission reductions because natural gas emits less CO2. 
There have also been studies that show these reductions came from leakage of electricity 
production to powerplants outside of the RGGI region. Ohio and Pennsylvania are considered 
“leaker states”, i.e., places where powerplants moved to after regulations increased. A study 
found that reduced coal-fired generation in RGGI-states was compensated for by increased 
generation in regions of Pennsylvania and Ohio (Fell and Maniloff 2018). It is estimated that 
CO2 emissions increased by 4.5 million tons per year in states where electricity generation 
leaked to and RGGI-states CO2 emissions decreased by 8.8 million tons per year, for an 
aggregate decrease of 4.3 million tons per year (Fell and Maniloff 2018). So, while leakage may 
decrease the real decline in CO2 emissions, RGGI has still been effective at achieving its 
overarching goal of reducing emissions.  
There are other impacts of RGGI that have not been extensively studied. Labor market 
effects and impact on regional growth have been studied for other environmental policies, such 
as the Clean Air Act Amendments, European Emissions Trading System, and the British 
Columbia carbon tax, but not for RGGI. Therefore, in order to gain a holistic view of the impact 
that RGGI has had, this paper seeks to analyze how RGGI has impacted annual employment 
growth for the policy region overall and for specific industries.  
Environmental Policy and Employment  8 
 
Section 3 – Literature Review 
 An increasing body of literature has been written on environmental regulations and their 
effects on employment. Each study approaches the issue in a unique way and there are no 
consistent results for or against the regulations. In this literature, the impact of environmental 
policies is related to the market conditions, sectors affected, and the structure of the policy itself. 
Some of the papers find positive effects of environmental policy on labor market outcomes, 
while others find a small negative effect or no effect (Berman and Bui 2001; Greenstone 2002; 
Morgenstern, Pizer, and Shih 2002; Abrell, Ndoye Faye, and Zachmann 2011; Yamazaki 2017; 
Marin, Marino, and Pellegrin 2018). When examining RGGI, there has been ample research on 
the impact of RGGI as it relates to decreasing greenhouse gas emissions and the leakage of 
energy generation (Kim and Kim 2016; Fell and Maniloff 2018; Huang and Zhou 2018; Chan 
and Morrow 2019). However, the impact that the CO2 emissions trading market has had on the 
labor market has not been studied. These papers provided me with insight into the way that 
environmental regulations have impacted employment and how this may relate to the way RGGI 
has influenced the labor market.  
 Section 3a of my literature review focuses on studies that have examined the effects of 
other environmental policies on labor market outcomes. Section 3b discusses papers that have 
looked at the effect of RGGI on energy and emission outcomes.  
Section 3a 
 In Yamazaki (2017), the researcher finds that the British Columbia (BC) carbon tax 
generated a 0.74% annual increase in employment over the years that the carbon tax was 
implemented. They came to this conclusion through the aggregation of the tax’s direct effect on 
employment within industries and the effect that the redistribution of the tax revenue had on 
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employment. Through trade intensity and emission intensity interaction terms, they were able to 
view the output effect of the carbon tax. They measured the redistribution effect of the tax by 
interacting BC’s overall greenhouse gas emissions from 2007 with the carbon tax. The 
coefficients that measured the output effect were negative, which aligned with their theoretical 
model. In this model, Yamazaki speculated that the BC carbon tax would increase marginal costs 
for industries and reduce their output, therefore reducing the number of employees needed to 
achieve the new level of output. However, since the BC carbon tax is revenue neutral, the 
researcher accounted for a redistribution effect in their analysis. In their theoretical model, 
Yamazaki illustrated that the redistribution effect would impact both labor supply and demand. If 
the tax revenue is redistributed to residents, as consumers they can spend their additional income 
on goods and services, increasing the goods and services’ demand, and therefore increasing the 
demand for labor to supply those goods and services. Supply of labor is increased because 
revenue-recycling “decreases distortion in the labor market” (Yamazaki 2017, 201). The 
substitution effect suggests that if an industry can easily switch from energy to labor in order to 
lessen the burden of the tax, they will do so and therefore increase labor demand. Yamazaki’s 
coefficient for the redistribution effect is positive throughout their various specifications, which 
aligns with their theoretical model. They plotted the change in employment by industry, which 
shows that industries that are both emission and trade intense will see a decrease in employment 
from the carbon tax, while industries that are either emission intense or trade intense (or neither) 
may see no employment effect or employment growth. When they aggregated the average effect 
for each industry, they found an overall positive impact on employment in BC from the carbon 
tax.  
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 In RGGI, each individual state determines what is done with their CO2 permit auction 
revenue, so my paper does not focus on the potential redistribution effects of RGGI revenue. 
However, that would be beneficial to explore as a more in-depth analysis of the impacts of RGGI 
on individual states within the RGGI region. The results from Yamazaki (2017) also show that, 
since the positive employment benefits come from the redistribution of the tax revenue, 
redistribution should be an avenue considered for future environmental policies or revisions of 
current ones.  
 In Berman and Bui (2001), the researchers looked at the impacts that air quality 
regulation from the Clean Air Act had on employment in the manufacturing sector in Los 
Angeles. They found that the employment effects of compliance with new regulations and 
increased stringency of existing regulations were zero, even when exit and dissuaded entry 
effects were included. When estimating the cumulative effects of 12 years of air quality 
regulation, Berman and Bui (2001) estimate that the regulation caused anywhere from 9,600 jobs 
lost to 12,300 jobs gained during the regulation time period. They posit that these small effects 
come from three factors. The first is that regulations apply disproportionately to capital-intensive 
factories with relatively little employment. The second is that the affected plants sell to local 
markets where their competitors face the same regulations that they do, so the regulations will 
not decrease sales. The final factor is that abatement inputs complement employment. The 
researchers use two mechanisms to show the effect that regulations have on employment: the 
output elasticity of labor demand and the marginal rates of substitution between pollution 
abatement activity and labor. The output effect is largely assumed to be negative, though if 
compliance with the regulation could be achieved through an investment that reduces marginal 
costs, the effect could be positive. The substitution effect is ambiguous and depends on the type 
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of abatement strategy assumed. If a factory adopts “end-of-pipe” technologies to abate pollution, 
labor will be complemented. However, if a factory improves the production process, the demand 
for labor will be reduced due to the skills bias of technological change.  
 Another important aspect that the researchers examine is the entry and exit of plants that 
is induced by environmental policy. They include this in their analysis by using comparison 
regions to represent the pattern of employment change that would have occurred in the South 
Coast without regulations. Compiling these patterns with employment trends in continuing 
plants, they were able to estimate the effects of regulation on employment including forced exit 
of plants and dissuaded entry. Again, they found no large negative employment effects.  
 Berman and Bui (2001) suggest that a possible explanation for the small employment 
effects is that the regulations target capital intensive industries with relatively little employment. 
Since RGGI only impacts electricity generating power-plants, this may also be an explanation for 
small employment effects caused by RGGI. They also discuss how regulations impact an entire 
industry as opposed to individual firms; therefore, output-demand from each individual firm will 
only be slightly reduced because an industry’s product demand curve is less elastic than an 
individual firm’s demand curve.   
 Greenstone (2002) also analyzed the impact that the Clean Air Act Amendments (CAAA) 
had on employment in counties that fell under regulation (nonattainment counties). They looked 
at both plant and industry level data and determined that nonattainment counties lost 
approximately 590,000 jobs compared to attainment counties. The CAAA cover various 
pollutants, including carbon monoxide (CO), ozone (O3), sulfur dioxide (SO2), and total 
suspended particles (TSPs). The researcher used a difference-in-difference analysis and found 
that the effects of these regulations overall had a negative impact on employment growth. These 
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negative effects were still seen when the results were broken down by industry. They also note 
that industries that emit multiple pollutants faced larger negative impacts than industries that 
only emitted one pollutant.   
 Morgenstern, Pizer, and Shih (2002) takes a unique approach to analyzing the impact that 
environmental policies have on labor market outcomes. Instead of focusing on a policy and using 
observational data, they utilize Census and plant-level data to observe input prices, outputs, and 
environmental expenditures to model the structure of production and how it depends on 
environmental expenditures. They decompose the effects of increased environmental spending 
into three components: increases in all factor inputs, holding output and factor shares constant 
(cost effect); changes in factor intensities (factor-shift effect); and changes in the quantity of 
output demanded (demand effect) (Morgenstern, Pizer, and Shih 2002, 413). The researchers 
analyzed the impact on increased environmental spending on four heavily polluting industries: 
pulp and paper; plastics; petroleum; and steel. With plastics and petroleum, they found a small 
positive impact on employment while in pulp and paper and steel there was no significant effect.   
 Abrell, Ndoye Faye, and Zachmann (2011) assessed the effectiveness of the European 
Emission Trading System (ETS) and the impact that it had on firms from 2005 to 2008. Their 
study is unique because it was the first to look at the entire EU as a whole, rather than focusing 
on the effects within specific countries. They also use a difference-in-difference analysis to 
isolate the impact that ETS had on a variety of economic performance indicators, such as 
employment, profits, and value added. They found that ETS had no significant impact on 
employment. Since the ETS distributed free permits within its first period, the researchers 
compared firms that received more emission permits than they needed (over-allocated firms) to 
ones that received less than they needed (under-allocated). They found that between these 
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different types of firms, over-allocated firms saw their profits increase because of ETS, while 
under-allocated firms saw their profits decrease. This has important implications for discussing 
the design of future cap-and-trade policies because it may be a concern that policy makers and 
citizens have. It is also important to note that RGGI does not distribute free allowances, so this 
issue should not impact my analysis.  
 Marin, Marino, and Pellegrin (2018) also looked at the effect that the European ETS had 
on the economic performance of European manufacturing firms across a panel of EU countries. 
They specifically use manufacturing firms in their analysis because they are subject to 
international competition, which may limit a firm’s ability to pass-through costs from ETS onto 
their consumers. These researchers also utilized a difference-in-difference approach to determine 
the effects of ETS on employment. They found that in the first phase of ETS, there was a small, 
weakly significant, negative effect on employment, but that effect disappears in the second phase 
of ETS.  
Section 3b 
Huang and Zhou (2019) examine how RGGI has decreased CO2 emissions in the policy 
region and how this reduction was achieved. The authors describe the five ways that power 
plants could have reduced their CO2 emissions: switching to a fuel with a lower carbon content; 
switching to a non-fossil fuel; improving energy efficiency during generation; sponsoring carbon 
offset projects; and generation leakage to non-RGGI states. Generation leakage means that the 
production of electricity is shifted to states that are not regulated and so do the emissions. With 
leakage, emissions within the RGGI region would appear to be decreasing while emissions in 
nearby states may be increasing to compensate for the RGGI region’s lack of generation. The 
researchers determined that generation leakage was the main avenue through which RGGI 
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achieved its emission reductions. They used a difference-in-difference analysis to determine the 
effect of RGGI on utility generation. Their control group consisted of states that were still in the 
Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland energy market but did not neighbor RGGI states. They 
found that coal-only utilities significantly reduce their utilization as a result of RGGI, while 
percent utilization increases in natural gas-only utilities, but the result was statistically 
insignificant so it is not caused by RGGI. In flexible utilities, ones that could use coal or natural 
gas, RGGI has no significant impact on their capacity. 
Huang and Zhou (2019) then examines the emission reductions caused by RGGI. They 
find that in Delaware and Maryland CO2 emissions were reduced by 19.10% of the average total 
potential annual emissions in those two states. However, based on the previous analysis of 
utilities, they determined that these reductions were achieved through leaking electricity 
generation to outside of RGGI states, instead of switching to fuels with lower emissions or 
investing in energy efficiency technology.  
As mentioned in Section 2, Fell and Maniloff (2018) also examine the effectiveness of 
RGGI on reducing CO2 emissions. Using a difference-in-difference analysis similar to Huang 
and Zhou (2019), they find that the emissions reductions in the RGGI region are attributable to 
generation leakage to other states, but that the leaked energy generation was generated using a 
less emission intensive fuel, namely, natural gas. This contributed to a net emission reduction 
even though leakage occurred. They analyzed the impact that RGGI had on both the policy 
region of RGGI and what they call “leaker regions”, Pennsylvania and Ohio. Their results show 
that the daily capacity of natural gas generators increased by 10 to 15% in leaker regions, while 
there was no significant change in the RGGI region in natural gas power plants. The daily 
capacity of coal-fired powerplants in the RGGI region decreased by 9% due to RGGI. 
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Kim and Kim (2016) attempt to show that RGGI increased the rate of coal to natural gas 
switching in electricity generation. They use a synthetic controls model to compare the RGGI 
region to a synthetic RGGI region generated from trends from the rest of the US (excluding 
Alaska and Hawaii). They find that the implementation of RGGI increased the share of natural 
gas in the policy region by 10 to 15% compared to the synthetic control region. This result 
suggests that RGGI accelerated the coal to gas switching rate in the region.  
Chan and Morrow (2019) use a difference-in-difference analysis to determine the effect 
that RGGI has had on CO2 emissions and other co-pollutants. Their results are consistent with 
the previous literature mentioned, finding that the reduction in coal energy generation in the 
RGGI region was replaced by energy generation outside of the RGGI region with cleaner fuels, 
such as natural gas. Therefore, leakage was still the main source of emission reductions, but the 
environmental harm of leakage was mitigated through fuel switching. They also found that 
RGGI caused a significant reduction in sulfur dioxide (SO2) emissions from the policy region, 
which has many beneficial health impacts.  
These papers are important for my research because they provide a framework for how to 
perform a difference-in-difference analysis with regards to the impacts of RGGI. They also 
provide a potential explanation for why there may be no impacts on the labor market because of 
RGGI. If electricity generation is leaked to other states instead, electricity prices may not be 
affected and input costs for firms may not increase because of RGGI. 
 As shown, much research has been done regarding the impact of other environmental 
policies on labor market outcomes and the impact of RGGI on emissions. However, there is little 
literature on the impact that RGGI has on labor market outcomes. Informed by these papers, I 
will expand their frameworks to examine the effect RGGI has on employment.  
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Section 4 – Theoretical Model 
To analyze the effect that RGGI has on labor market outcomes, I utilize a simple model 
to depict the various changes that occur within a competitive market structure. This model 
represents a market that uses electricity, such as manufacturing. This market would be impacted 
by RGGI when the electric utility industry passes through the cost of CO2 allowances to 
electricity prices. Therefore, electricity is an input. There are three factors that need to be 
considered to show the impacts that a policy has on employment. They are market supply and 
demand; individual firm output; and individual firm input.  
 As shown in Figure 2, the market demand and supply curve intersect when at 
equilibrium, setting the market equilibrium price (P0) and quantity (Q0) for a manufacturing 
good. At the individual firm level, the firm’s marginal cost curve (MCi) is equivalent to its 
individual supply curve (Si). The equilibrium price at the market level determines the output at 
the individual firm level (y0). The individual firm’s output level then determines its input levels, 
represented by the isoquant curve in the Firm Input graph. The isoquant curve graphs the 
different combinations of labor and electricity input that will yield the firm’s output level, y0. In 
addition to the isoquant curve, there is an iso-cost (IC0) curve on the Firm Input graph. This line 
represents the various combinations of electricity and labor input quantities that yield the same 
total cost of production. The point where the iso-cost curve is tangent to the isoquant curve 
determines the equilibrium quantity of labor input and electricity input. 
 When a policy like RGGI is implemented, the curves in these three graphs will shift. For 
an individual firm, the marginal cost curve will increase because the input of electricity increases 
in price. Hintermann (2016) shows that utility companies in the EU nearly completely pass on 
the cost of the emission allowance to their electricity consumers, increasing electricity prices.  
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As shown in Figure 3, at P0 the new MCi creates a new optimum output for the individual firm, 
labeled y1. This makes the firm’s iso-cost curve steeper on the Firm Input graph. This steeper 
iso-cost curve actually increases the labor input within the firm, which is referred to as the 
factor-substitution effect. This is shown by the movement from point A to point B. However, 
since the firm is producing a different output due to the increased marginal cost, a new isoquant 
curve needs to be drawn, labeled y1. Since the iso-cost curve is a part of a series of curves that 
can be applied at different output levels, we can view IC2 on the new isoquant curve, y1. The new 
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point of tangency, point C, shows the final effect of RGGI. The decrease in labor input from 
point B to point C is called the output effect. The change in labor input from point A to point C is 
the total effect of the policy, and while these graphs show a slight increase in labor input, the size 
of these changes and overall direction cannot be determined through theory alone.  
Since increasing electricity prices impact all firms within an industry, the market supply curve 
will also shift (S1). This shift causes the equilibrium quantity and price to move to Q1 and P1. 
This new equilibrium price will impact the output of an individual firm, shifting it from y1 to y2. 
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This increase in equilibrium market price somewhat offsets the initial decrease in output 
attributable to the increase in marginal cost.  
This change in output will again cause the iso-cost and isoquant curves to move, which is 
reflected in Figure 4. Therefore, the total effect of an environmental policy from the factor-
substitution effect and output effect are ambiguous. This is why further empirical analysis is 
needed to determine the size and direction of the effects.  
Section 5 – Empirical Analysis 
Section 5a – Data  
 I examined the effect of RGGI on labor market outcomes by obtaining employment data 
from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. These data were available annually by state and industry 
using the 2002 North American Industry Classification System (NAICS). My dataset consisted 
of 21 industries, 16 states, and 18 years (2001-2018). I used data from 2001 to 2018 because that 
allowed for me to have data from eight years before RGGI began and ten years after RGGI was 
implemented. These data are from the Bureau of Economic Analysis reported the number of jobs 
for each year by state and industry, but for my analysis I used the annual change in employment. 
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I calculated this by the natural log of time t and subtracting it by the natural log of time t-1 
(Simon 1998). I use this as my dependent variable because there is a large size differential 
between my control and treatment groups. Using the annual employment growth rate normalizes 
the two groups. It is also similar the dependent variable that Greenstone (2002) uses. Table 1 
shows the descriptive statistics for total employment and the covariates that I use to control for 
other effects. Table 2 show the descriptive statistics for employment growth rate over the 
specified time period. Table 2 is also broken down by Industry Type. According to the U.S 
Energy Information Association farming, mining, utilities, construction, manufacturing, and 
transportation are the most energy intense industries within the United States. Based off of this, 
Energy Intense Industries are the ones listed above and Non-Energy Intense are any industries 
not included. Table 3 and Table 4 show the descriptive statistics for employment growth rate 
from before RGGI was implemented and after RGGI was implemented. These tables are also 
specified by industry energy intensity. 
The data that I used for my wage covariate were also obtained from the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis. Annual wages were reported by both state and industry utilizing the same 
NAICS code as my employment data, which allowed me to manually merge the two datasets. I 
included industry-specific wage in time t-1 as a measure of labor costs (Greenstone 2002). Other 
covariates that I included are share of unemployment in time t-1; educational attainment by share 
of population; share of population in public housing; share of population using lunch subsidies; 
share of population using rent subsidies; share of population with less than two children; share of 
population using food stamps; share of population by race; share of population by gender; and 
share of population by age. These covariates are included to control for any changes that occur 
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over time across states that is not picked up by state fixed effects. I obtained these data from the 
Integrated Public Use Microdata Series Current Population Survey. 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics (2001-2018) 
 N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Control      
 Employment 2646 226050.28 229529.93 2836 1129436 
 Wage 2499 8114635.4 10136381 22653 53087784 
 Share of Unemployment 2499 .032 .009 .015 .059 
 Share of Higher Edu 2646 .172 .039 .098 .283 
 Share of Public Housing 2646 .025 .008 .007 .063 
 Share of Food Stamp 2646 .113 .04 .039 .216 
 Share of Pop. Black 2646 .118 .049 .034 .208 
 Share of Pop. Male 2646 .49 .002 .483 .495 
 Share of Pop. Other 2646 .032 .02 .008 .081 
 Share of Pop. Ages 10-14 2646 .066 .005 .057 .075 
 Share of Pop. Ages 15-19 2646 .068 .004 .059 .075 
 Share of Pop. Ages 20-44 2646 .334 .017 .301 .379 
 Share of Pop. Ages 45-64 2646 .263 .015 .221 .292 
 Share of Pop. Ages 65+ 2646 .143 .019 .112 .2 
RGGI 
 Employment 3326 132020.17 227441.52 185 1773596 
 Wage 3141 5695364.2 12139455 276 1.230e+08 
 Share of Unemployment 3213 .03 .01 .014 .065 
 Share of Higher Edu 3402 .225 .038 .15 .31 
 Share of Public Housing 3402 .034 .016 .012 .075 
 Share of Food Stamp 3402 .094 .04 .024 .178 
 Share of Pop. Black 3402 .115 .098 .007 .32 
 Share of Pop. Male 3402 .487 .004 .481 .496 
 Share of Pop. Other 3402 .046 .023 .015 .105 
 Share of Pop. Ages 10-14 3402 .064 .006 .054 .076 
 Share of Pop. Ages 15-19 3402 .07 .004 .058 .079 
 Share of Pop. Ages 20-44 3402 .33 .02 .289 .373 
 Share of Pop. Ages 45-64 3402 .274 .02 .228 .312 
 Share of Pop. Ages 65+ 3402 .146 .019 .113 .206 
Total      
 Employment 5972 173681.87 233079.07 185 1773596 
 Wage 5640 6767307.2 11358637 276 1.230e+08 
 Share of Unemployment 5712 .031 .009 .014 .065 
 Share of Higher Edu 6048 .201 .046 .098 .31 
 Share of Public Housing 6048 .03 .014 .007 .075 
 Share of Food Stamp 6048 .102 .042 .024 .216 
 Share of Pop. Black 6048 .116 .081 .007 .32 
 Share of Pop. Male 6048 .488 .004 .481 .496 
 Share of Pop. Other 6048 .04 .023 .008 .105 
 Share of Pop. Ages 10-14 6048 .065 .005 .054 .076 
 Share of Pop. Ages 15-19 6048 .069 .004 .058 .079 
 Share of Pop. Ages 20-44 6048 .332 .019 .289 .379 
 Share of Pop. Ages 45-64 6048 .269 .019 .221 .312 
 Share of Pop. Ages 65+ 6048 .144 .019 .112 .206 
The measure of Employment in this table is number of jobs. N is the number of observations. 
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Table 2: Employment Growth Descriptive Statistics by Region and Industry (2001-2018) 
 
Industry Type Statistics Control Region RGGI 
Non-Energy Intense N 1905 2452 
 Mean .01 .011 
 SD .029 .043 
 Min -.141 -.297 
 Max .165 1.123 
Energy Intense N 741 874 
 Mean -.003 -.001 
 SD .053 .066 
 Min -.206 -.439 
 Max .235 .361 
The measure of this table is employment growth: ∆ ln(𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡) = ln⁡(𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡)𝑡 ⁡– ⁡ln⁡(𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡)𝑡−1. 
N is the number of observations. 
 
Table 3: Employment Growth Descriptive Statistics Pre-RGGI by Region and Industry (2001-2008) 
Industry Type Statistics Control Region RGGI 
Non-Energy Intense N 765 987 
 Mean .015 .015 
 SD .031 .051 
 Min -.121 -.297 
 Max .165 1.123 
Energy Intense N 324 407 
 Mean -.004 -.002 
 SD .047 .061 
 Min -.162 -.243 




Table 4: Employment Growth Descriptive Statistics Post-RGGI by Region and Industry (2009-2018) 
 
Industry Type Statistics Control Region RGGI 
Non Energy Intense N 1097 1372 
 Mean .007 .009 
 SD .027 .036 
 Min -.141 -.204 
 Max .156 .545 
Energy Intense N 460 560 
 Mean -.002 0 
 SD .057 .07 
 Min -.206 -.439 
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In the pre-RGGI time period, annual employment growth in energy intense industries in 
the control region and RGGI region were decreasing by 0.4% and 0.2% respectively. After 
RGGI was implemented, the average annual employment in the control region continues to 
decrease, while average annual employment within the RGGI region is 0. 
It is important to note that New Jersey was excluded from my data. New Jersey withdrew 
from RGGI in 2012 and rejoined in 2020. If included, New Jersey would only experience the 
treatment for three years of the ten treatment years. Therefore, excluding New Jersey allows for 
my analysis to have a consistent treatment group. All of the active RGGI states during this time 
period make up my treatment group, minus New Jersey. My control group is comprised of states 
with the Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland (PJM) electricity market that are not a part of 
RGGI. These states include Pennsylvania, Virginia, West Virginia, Ohio, Kentucky, Indiana, and 
Illinois. I chose these states for my control group because they are similar to the RGGI region in 
terms of employment composition and being a part of the same electricity market allows for low 
cross-border trading costs (Huang and Zhou 2019).  
Section 5b – Methods 
 This section discusses the econometric design of estimate the employment effect of 
RGGI. The simple model illustrated that the total employment effects are determined by two 
effects: the factor substitution effect and output effect. These two effects make the overall 
theoretical effect ambiguous. Therefore, using available data I attempt to estimate the total effect 
of RGGI using the following difference-in-difference equation:  
𝑌𝑖𝑠𝑡 = 𝛽1𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝐺𝐺𝐼𝑠 + 𝛽2𝑿𝒔𝒕 + 𝜏𝑠𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖 + 𝛼𝑠 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝑖𝑠𝑡⁡ (1) 
where 𝑌𝑖𝑠𝑡 is employment growth measured by ∆ ln(𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡) = ⁡ ln⁡(𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡)𝑡 −
⁡ln⁡(𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡)𝑡−1, 𝜏𝑠𝑡 is a state-specific time trend, 𝛿𝑖 is industry fixed effects, 𝛼𝑠 is state 
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fixed effects, 𝛾𝑡 is year fixed effects, and 𝑖𝑠𝑡 is the error term. 𝑿𝒔𝒕 is a vector of variables that 
measure differences between states over time. 𝑿𝒔𝒕 includes all of the covariates listed in Section 
5a. 𝛽1 is the difference-in-difference estimator for the interaction term between the post variable 
Aftert and the dummy variable for RGGI, RGGIs. 𝛽1represents the effect that RGGI has on the 
annual employment growth rate. To obtain the effect by industry, I run equation (1) with only the 
data for each specific industry and drop the industry fixed effects while still including the other 
fixed effects and time trends. I include the state-specific time trend (𝜏𝑠𝑡) in order to better 
capture the different recoveries across states from the Great Recession because RGGI and the 
Great Recession occurred at the same time. While I do attempt to include controls for these 
factors within my difference-in-difference regressions using covariates, fixed effects, and time 
trends, there may still be a bias that is unaccounted for that impacts my coefficient for estimating 
the impacts of RGGI.  
A critical aspect of a difference-in-difference analysis is to show estimates for the 
treatment group in the periods before the policy was implemented and afterwards. This will 
verify that there are no differential pre-trends and show that the coefficients are based off of 
changes that occur when the policy was implemented. I estimate the event study using the 
following equation: 




where 𝜌𝑠𝑡 indicates the event year, which takes a value equal to one when an observation is j 
years away from when RGGI was implemented. These event dummy variables replace the 
𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝐺𝐺𝐼𝑠 treatment dummy from equation (1). 𝜌𝑠𝑡 indexes these dummy variables for 
years relative to the implementation of RGGI such that 𝜌𝑠𝑡 = 0 denotes the year that RGGI 
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began. Period -1 is the reference period. The vector 𝑿𝒔𝒕 includes all control variables in the 






















The trends before the implementation a RGGI are fairly constant, which shows a lack of 
pre-trends in the annual employment growth rate. After 2009, the coefficient increases and even 
turns positive.  
I use Stata/SE 16.1 to run my difference-in-difference analysis.  
Section 5c – Results  
 Table 5 shows the results for equation (1) overall and for specific industries. Column (1) 
Total shows the results from equation (1) with no industry specification, which is the overall 
effect of RGGI. These results shows that there is no effect of RGGI on employment growth. This 
is consistent with results regarding the labor market impact because of other environmental 
Figure 5: Event Study for Coefficient on Employment Growth Rate 
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regulations from Berman and Bui (2001), Abrell, Ndoye Faye, and Zachmann (2011), Yamazaki 
(2017), and Marin, Marino, and Pellegrin (2018).  
Table 5 also reports the estimates for the industry-specific effects of RGGI from equation 
(1) in columns (2) through (16). These estimates, as well as the total effect, are estimated with 
standard errors that are clustered by state. The weakly significant negative coefficient on mining 
is consistent with the results from Yamazaki (2017), who showed that energy intense industries 
are more impacted by environmental regulations than non-energy intense industries. Since RGGI 
is most likely to impact energy prices, it is reasonable that employment in an energy intense 
industry would be impacted. The statistically significant coefficients for finance and 
accommodation services are less easily understood through the framework of RGGI, which 
could be arising from unobserved factors that are being absorbed into the coefficient for the 
effect of RGGI. While I used covariates and fixed effects to attempt to capture the effect of 
RGGI for a causal interpretation, there still may be unobserved factors. For example, my results 
may be biased if the data do not properly control for the employment effects of the Great 
Recession because the impacts differed between the control and treatment groups.  
It is important to note that the lack of an overall significant impact on the employment 
growth rate does not mean that individual industries were not impacted. This result is masking 
the significant heterogeneous impacts at the industry level. Based on my results, it appears that 
implementing RGGI has caused a decrease in the annual employment growth rate of the mining 
industry by 0.09 percentage points. That being said, most industries were unaffected by the 
implementation of RGGI.  







Table 5: Difference-in-Difference Results 
 
All regressions include state-specific time trends and covariates that vary by state and over time. 
All regressions are weighted by average state population. 
Cons stands for Construction; Manu stands for Manufacturing; WT stands for Wholesale Trade; Trans stands for Transportation; Fin stands for Finance; RE stands 
for Real Estate; Prof stands for Professional Services; HC stands for Health Care; Acc stands for Accommodation Services; and Service stands for Other Services. 
Other industries not included in this table are Farming, Forestry, Retail Trade, Information, Management of Companies, and Arts. 





      (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8)   (9)   (10)   (11)   (12)   (13)   (14)   (15)  (16) 
        
Total 
    
Mining 
    
Utilities 
    
Cons 
   
Manu 
    
WT 
    
Trans 
    
Fin 
    
RE 
    
Prof 
   
Admin 
    
Edu 
    
HC 
    
Acc 
   
Service 
    
Gov 
β1 -.001 -.09* .014 -.016 .014 .008 0 -.013** .005 -.007 -.006 .001 .005 .011** -.008 -.005 
   
 
(.003) (.043) (.017) (.012) (.008) (.006) (.013) (.006) (.006) (.006) (.007) (.005) (.003) (.004) (.005) (.004) 
R2 
 
.213 .861 .656 .89 .927 .921 .874 .883 .931 .853 .83 .669 .633 .85 .885 .659 
N 
 
5618 230 270 266 272 272 270 272 272 272 272 272 272 272 270 272 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Ind FE Yes No No No No No No No No No No No No No No No 
Standard errors are in parentheses 
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1  
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Section 5d – Robustness Checks 
 This paper has attempted to estimate the causal effect of RGGI on employment. Even 
with a perfect econometric design, non-experimental research might be vulnerable to unobserved 
variations that could confound the causal interpretation. To ensure the reliability of the estimates, 
I probed the robustness of the estimates through utilizing different control regions. I find 
consistency with my previous results for a decrease in mining employment, but the other results 
vary slightly between different control regions. This suggests that the specifications and data in 
my analysis could be altered in order to improve the robustness of the results.  
 Table 6 and Table 7 show the results from my difference-in-difference analysis using two 
different control groups. Table 6 drops Pennsylvania and Ohio from the control group because 
they are what Kim and Kim (2016) specify as “leaker states” for electricity generation for the 
RGGI region. The results for Mining and Accommodation Services are consistent with the 
results from Table 5. However, this regression shows a weakly significant increase in annual 
employment growth for the entire policy region because of RGGI. Forestry, Wholesale Trade, 
and Real Estate also show significant impacts on employment growth because of RGGI, which 
were not present in the regression from Table 5.  
 Table 7 uses only states that neighbor the RGGI region as the control group. Again, the 
result for the Mining industry is consistent with the results from my original analysis. However, 
from this analysis the weakly significant impact on the overall policy region is negative, which is 
different from the results in Table 5 and Table 6. Many other industries also show a significant 
impact on annual employment growth that Table 5 and Table 6 did not show.  






Table 6: Difference-in-difference Result Dropping Pennsylvania and Ohio 
  
      (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)  (5)   (6)  (7)   (8)   (9)   (10)   (11)   (12)   (13)   (14)   (15)   (16)   (17)   (18)   (19)   (20)   (21)   (22) 
    Total Farm For Min Util Con Man WT RT Tran Info Fin RE Pro Mng Adm Edu HC Arts Acc Serv Gov 
 β1 .003* .005 .026** -.062** .017 -.006 .006 .012* .001 -.011 .004 -.01 .01* -.005 -.019 -.008 .004 .004 .005 .017*** -.008 -.003 
   
 
(.001) (.015) (.011) (.025) (.01) (.011) (.01) (.007) (.003) (.007) (.011) (.006) (.005) (.008) (.018) (.007) (.008) (.003) (.009) (.004) (.005) (.004) 
 N 
 
4904 238 199 196 236 232 238 238 238 236 236 238 238 238 238 238 238 238 238 238 236 238 
 R2 
 
.211 .461 .816 .873 .614 .886 .92 .907 .899 .876 .789 .895 .929 .843 .387 .799 .626 .592 .613 .834 .893 .664 
Year 
FE 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State 
FE 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Ind 
FE 
Yes No No No No No No No No No No No No No No No No No No No No No 
 
Control Region: Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Virginia, West Virginia 
Treatment Region: All 2009 RGGI states (excluding New Jersey) 
All regressions include state-specific time trends and covariates that vary by state and over time. 
All regressions are weighted by average state population. 
Farm stands for Farming; For stands for Forestry; Min stands for Mining; Util stands for Utilities; Con stands for Construction; Man stands for Manufacturing; WT stands for Wholesale Trade; RT stands for 
Retail Trade; Tran stands for Transportation; Info stands for Information Services; Fin stands for Finance; RE stands for Real Estate; Pro stands for Professional Services; Mng stands for Management of 
Companies; Adm stands for Administrative Services; HC stands for Health Care; Acc stands for Accommodation Services; and Serv stands for Other Services. 
Standard errors are in parentheses 











Table 7: Difference-in-difference Result Using Only Neighboring States in the PJM Energy Market 
  
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7)   (8)   (9)   (10) (11) (12)   (13)   (14)   (15)   (16)   (17)   (18)   (19)   (20)   (21)   (22) 
    Total Farm For Min Util Con Man WT RT Tran Info Fin RE Pro Mng Adm Edu HC Arts Acc Serv Gov 
 β1 -.004* -.006 .018 -.132** .004 -.019 .001 .002 -.001 -.009 .009 -.016*** .014* -.016** -.027 -.006 -.001 .008** .001 .012 -.01* -.011* 
   
 
(.002) (.012) (.012) (.055) (.022) (.01) (.01) (.005) (.004) (.009) (.01) (.005) (.007) (.007) (.016) (.007) (.006) (.003) (.012) (.007) (.005) (.006) 
 N 
 
4190 204 165 162 202 198 204 204 204 202 202 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 202 204 
 R2 
 
.212 .469 .897 .873 .65 .894 .943 .929 .891 .876 .818 .889 .929 .842 .429 .817 .562 .613 .576 .834 .878 .706 
Year 
FE 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State 
FE 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Ind 
FE 
Yes No No No No No No No No No No No No No No No No No No No No No 
 
Control Region: Pennsylvania, Virginia, and West Virginia 
Treatment Region: All 2009 RGGI states (excluding New Jersey) 
All regressions include state-specific time trends and covariates that vary by state and over time. 
All regressions are weighted by average state population. 
Farm stands for Farming; For stands for Forestry; Min stands for Mining; Util stands for Utilities; Con stands for Construction; Man stands for Manufacturing; WT stands for Wholesale Trade; RT stands for 
Retail Trade; Tran stands for Transportation; Info stands for Information Services; Fin stands for Finance; RE stands for Real Estate; Pro stands for Professional Services; Mng stands for Management of 
Companies; Adm stands for Administrative Services; HC stands for Health Care; Acc stands for Accommodation Services; and Serv stands for Other Services. 
Standard errors are in parentheses 
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1  
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 These results suggest that the inclusion of different states in the analysis does affect the 
analysis of the employment effect of RGGI. This is always a concern when using a simple 
difference-in-difference analysis. Without proper specifications to control unobserved variables, 
the differences estimator can be impacted by events that occurred simultaneously with RGGI. 
For future analyses, it will be important to introduce more controls for these unobserved 
variables in order to attain more robust results.  
Section 6 – Discussion and Conclusion 
 
This paper provides evidence that a carbon cap-and-trade policy had no effect on 
employment. The existing literature provides mixed findings on how an environmental 
regulation affects employment in a regulated region, and no existing papers have looked at the 
impact that RGGI has had on employment. Using a difference-in-difference analysis, this paper 
found that overall RGGI had no impact on employment. However, when analyzed at the industry 
level, RGGI had a weakly significant negative impact on employment within the mining 
industry.  
While these results are consistent with other studies that have shown environmental 
policies that have no effect on the labor market, there is still more research that can be done on 
the impacts of RGGI. Gathering plant-level data may provide a more concrete view of the way 
that RGGI has affected employment. It would also be beneficial to determine the true pass 
through price from emissions allowances to electricity because that is the main avenue through 
which RGGI would impact industries outside of the utility sector. In future analyses, it will also 
be important to control for other policies that might impact labor market outcomes during the 
time period that RGGI was implemented.  
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An analysis that looks at the redistribution effects of RGGI would also provide a more in 
depth look at how RGGI impacts the labor market. As Yamazaki (2017) showed, the 
redistribution effect of the BC carbon tax was the aspect of the policy that generated the most 
growth in employment. An analysis of how each state utilizes their revenue from the auctions of 
CO2 allowances was too large for the scope of this project. That type of analysis would provide 
insight into why there have not been larger declines in employment, especially within energy 
intense industries. It may also provide suggestions for how states could improve their allocation 
of the revenue in order to decrease the effects that RGGI may have on energy intensive 
industries, such as mining.  
It is also important to consider how these results relate to issues of environmental and 
social justice. While there may be no overall effect of the policy, people and communities whose 
economic livelihoods depend on energy intensive industries may be adversely impacted by 
RGGI and similar environmental policies. Curtis (2014) shows that another cap-and-trade 
program, the NOx Budget Trading Program, negatively impacted employment in the 
manufacturing sector. They also found that young employees were the hardest hit in terms of 
increased unemployment and decreased wages. A future research paper might determine which 
demographics are most impacted by a carbon cap-and-trade policy, like RGGI, and how the 
policy can be revised to mitigate such effects.  
Another future research project might be to take this analysis of the labor market further 
and create a holistic argument about the effect of RGGI on employment. This research would 
entail looking at the extent to which the increase in energy prices from RGGI triggers 
substitution to renewable sources of electricity that could in turn generate jobs in the renewable 
energy sector. That being said, my study only goes as far as analyzing the impact that the 
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increased energy prices from RGGI have had on employment growth rates. My analysis has 
shown that the increase in input cost has not significantly impacted the employment growth rate 
within the majority of industries, with the exception of mining, an energy intense industry. If 
these results are indicative of the true relationship between RGGI and its labor market outcomes, 
it supports previous studies that showed environmental regulations did not have a negative 
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